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CURRENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-INADmIssIBILrry OF DocU-
MENTS TAxEN IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS.-The
defendant was suspected oi conspiring to defraud the government through
contracts for clothing and equipment. A private in the army, attached to the
Intelligence Department, under guise of making a friendly call upon the defen-
dant, gained admission to his office, and, during his absence, without any warrant,
seized and carried away documents. These documents were offered in evidence
and received over the objections of the defendant. Held, upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, that the papers were not admissible in evidence, as their use
would be in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.
Gouled v. United States (1921) 41 Sup. Ct. 261.
The instant case follows the rules laid down previously regarding the construc-
tion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Boyd v. United States (1886) 116
U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524; Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup.
Ct. 341. Papers unlawfully seized cannot be used in framing an indictment,
and even though the government has returned the papers, it cannot use the
information obtained from them. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
(1920) 251 U. S. 385, 4o Sup. Ct. 182. For a complete discussion of this
subject see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 HARV. L.
REV. 361.
PERSONS-MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT FOR FRAuD.-The plaintiff sued to annul
a marriage for misrepresentation by the defendant husband regarding his
honesty. The parties had never cohabited. Held, that the marriage should be
annulled. Sheridan v. Sheridan (1921, Sup. Ct.) 186 N. Y. Supp. 47o.
As a general rule, misrepresentation as to character does not go sufficiently to
the essentials of the marital relation to constitute a ground for an annulment of
the marriage contract. In New York, however, every misrepresentation of a
material fact without which the marriage would not have been entered into,
authorizes an annulment, providing there are no children. See (1920) 30. YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 88; (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 218.
PROPERTY-SURFACE WATERs-LoTs MAY BE SO GRADED AS TO SHED WATER ON
ADJOINING LAND.-The defendants constructed a sidewalk which conducted
the water falling from their building to the rear of their premises; where, uniting
with the other surface water, it flowed onto the plaintiffs' land and undermined
a retaining wall. Held, that the defendant was privileged to improve his land
even though the effect was to change the course of the surface water so that
it flowed on other land. Listont v. Scott (1921, Kan.) 194 Pac. 642.
There is a sharp conflict on the question whether a land owner is privileged to
drain surface water from his land on to that of an adjacent owner. According
to one theory, an owner need only receive that volume of surface water which
would flow from the adjacent land in its natural course. Johnson v. White
(1904) 26 R. I. 2o7, 58 Atl. 658; Steinke v. North Vernon Lbr. Co. (1921, Ky.) 227
S. W. 274. The modern tendency appears to favor the view that an owner may
grade or improve his premises as he will, regardless of its effect upon his
neighbor, unless his acts are malicious or unnecessarily injurious. Aldritt v.
Fleischauer (i9o5) 74 Neb. 66, lO3 N. W. 1O84; Hartle v. Neighbauer (1919)
142 Minn. 430, 172 N. W. 498. For a collection of the cases see I Tiffany, Real
Property (192o ed.) sec. 341 (c) ; see also (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 686.
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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAx-FEDERAL ESTATE TAx DEDUCTBLF-The
plaintiff, having paid the federal estate tax under the provisions of the War
Revenue Act of October 3, 1917 (40 Stat at L. 300, 324) amending the Act of
September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 756, 777) as amended by the act of March 3,
1917 (39 Stat. at L. IOOO, Ioo2), upon an estate of which they are the executors,
paid the federal income tax on that estate, as required by sec. 225 of the Revenue
Act of I918 (40 Stat. at L. io74), claiming as a deduction the amount paid under
the federal estate tax. Upon a refusal to allow the deduction, suit was instituted
to recover the amount. Held, that the amount paid under the estate tax was
deductible from the income tax. Woodward v. United States (March 14, 192i)
U. S. Ct. of Claims, No. 34734.
The decision may be sustained only by the court's interpretation of sec. 214 of
the Revenue Act of 1918, which provides that "there shall be allowed as deduc-
tions . . . taxes paid or accrued . . . imposed by the authority of the United
States, except income, war profits and excess profits taxes." It is opposed to the
theory of the leading case on the subject, that an inheritance tax is not a tax
upon the legatee or the corpus of the estate but upon the'power of transmitting
property by will or descent. United States v. Perkins (1895) 163 U. S. 625, 16
Sup. Ct. 1O73; Prentiss v. Eisner (192o, C. C. A. 2d) 267 Fed. 16. An appeal
to the Supreme Court will compel an exact definition of that theory or its prac-
tical rejection. See (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 19g; Holmes, Federal :',7xes
(1920) 368; (I92I) 7 A. B. A. Joum. I3I.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-LABILITY FOR USE OF DANGEROuS AGENCY.-The defen-
dant railroad kindled a fire on its own land for the purpose of burning up dry
leaves. The property was near a playground and was crossed by a path which
the -public were permitted to use at will. Some time after the firi was sta-ted,
a child, five years old, was discovered in flames on or near the property. The
child having died, his administrator brought this action. Held, that he should
recover, regardless of any implied invitation to the child, because of the
defendant's liability for the use of a dangerous agency. Piraccini v. Director
Gen. of Railroads (i92o, N. J.) 112 Atl. 311.
This case is extreme in view of the fact that New Jersey has repudiated the
attractive nuisance doctrine and held that a landowner owes no duty to a
licensee or trespasser, even though a child, except to refrain from wilfully
injuring him. D. L, & W. Ry. v. Reich (1898) 61 N. J. L. 635, 40 AtI. 682.;
Fleckenstein v. Tea Co. (1917) 91 N. J. L. 145, 1O2 Atl. 7oo. The rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L. R: 3 H. L. 33o, has not been generally followed
in this country and the dangerous agency doctrine is usually not carried so far.
See (920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2o0; (1916) 25 id. 679. For a discussion of
the real problem involved in cases like'the instant one see COMMENTS (1919)
29 id. 223.
TORTS-PRENATAL INJURIES-INFANT ALLOWED TO RzcovER.-While the plaintiff
was en ventre sa inre, his mother was injured due to the defendant's negligehce
in leaving a coal hole uncovered; and the plaintiff, born eleven days later, was
thereby permanently injured. The lower court overruled the defendant's
demurrer to the complaint. Held, that the judgment should be affirmed. Clarke,
P. J. and Page, J., dissenting. Drobner v. Peters (1921) 194 App. Div. 696, 186
N. Y. Supp. 278.
The instant case is notable in that it seems to be the first one to allow recovery
under these circumstances. See 14 R. C. L. 218; 45 L. R. A. (N. s.) 625, note.
For a discussion recommending recovery if, at the time of the injury, the child
could have been viable see COMMENTS (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 315. For
a discussion of the decision of the lower court see NoTEs (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV.
549.
